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Abstract 
Over the last three decades, EU regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, 
affecting practically all the domains of European citizens’ lives. Many studies have focused on 
understanding the process and causes of regulatory reform. However, these have typically been 
small-scale or small-n studies, with no or limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of 
regulatory reform. In this paper, we focus on the determinants of stability and change in EU 
regulation. We develop an original dataset of 169 pieces of legislation (regulations, directives and 
decisions) across eight different sectors, and analyse the dynamics of regulatory reform in the EU. 
Using time series analysis of count data, we find evidence that the number of winning coalitions in 
the Council and the size of EU membership have a significant impact on regulatory reform in the 
EU. However, the political (left-right) composition of EU’s legislative bodies has no significant 
impact on the process of regulatory reform. 
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1. Introduction 
The historical role played by the EU in promoting regulatory reform in Europe is widely recognised 
in the literature on EU market integration (Majone 1996; Scharpf 1996; Héritier et al. 2001; Young 
2007). This literature has generally identified two phases of market integration. The first phase was 
eminently de-regulatory and culminated with the Cassis de Dijon case in 1979, and aimed at 
removing all the national-level barriers that could prevent or constrain free trade across the 
European Community. The second phase – also known as the re-regulatory or ‘positive integration’ 
phase (Scharpf 1996) – was aimed at reconstructing at the supranational level the set of rules that 
were abolished at the national level, in order to make the common market work properly. A large 
volume of research has focused on this second phase (e.g. Harcourt & Radaelli 1999; Egan 2001; 
Quaglia 2007; Baskoy 2008; Kassim 2010), and in particular on the shifting paradigms of 
regulation and the process of regulatory change. These studies, however, have typically adopted a 
qualitative research design, which has prevented broader generalizations on the patterns and drivers 
of regulatory change in the EU. As a consequence, a number of important questions have not yet 
been properly addressed by the literature: to what extent does regulatory reform in the EU follow a 
general and consistent pattern of incremental change? And what are the political and institutional 
conditions that explain the stability and change in regulatory policies?  
In this paper we address these questions. We make two contributions to the literature. First, 
following a recently developed method for measuring change in regulatory policy outputs (Knill et 
al. 2012), we develop a new and original dataset  of EU regulatory legislation across eight different 
areas in the utilities sector (electricity, gas, telecommunications and postal services) and transport 
sector (road, railway, maritime and air transport) and analyse how these regulations have changed 
over a period of  29 years (1984-2012). These data provide a new and unique source of information 
on regulatory reforms within the EU. Second, we investigate the influence of a number of EU-level 
political and institutional variables on the process and pattern of regulatory reform. Specifically, we 
examine how regulatory reform is affected by the change in legislative procedure (particularly the 
change from consultation/cooperation to co-decision, which added a new formal veto player), the 
ability to form winning coalitions in the Council (determined by the changing QMV thresholds and 
voting weights), the enlarging membership of the EU, and the different level of ‘policy 
entrepreneurship’ of the Commission.  
The paper develops as follows: The next section reviews the literature concerned with the 
problem of measuring policy outputs, explaining the particular challenges offered by regulatory 
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policies and showing how some recent measurements developed in the literature can be employed 
to quantify regulatory reform in the eight areas studied in this paper. We also explain the three-tier 
coding scheme used for the analysis of legislative provisions. The following section presents a 
number of political and institutional variables that may contribute to explain stability and change in 
regulatory legislation. Subsequently, we use regression models for count data to examine the 
institutional and political sources of regulatory reform within the sectors covered by our data. The 
final section concludes on the main findings.  
 
2. The problem of measuring regulatory policy change 
The study of policy stability and change has advanced considerably in the last couple of decades. 
We can identify at least two branches of this literature. The first – which is mainly theoretical – 
focuses on the conceptualization of different types of policy change, and is based on taxonomies 
classifying different degrees of policy reforms, from small policy adjustments to large-scale policy 
reforms. This branch was initiated by Peter Hall with his path-breaking study on policy paradigms 
and the three orders of change (Hall 1993), and has successively been developed by a number of 
authors, who have gradually refined and enriched Hall’s famous typology (Coleman et al. 1996; 
Cashore & Howlett 2007; Howlett & Cashore 2009; Henstra 2011).  
The second branch has a more empirical approach, and has centred on the quantitative analysis 
of policy dynamics in the long run, based on large comparative datasets. Baumgartner and Jones 
have pioneered this approach by studying how policy stability and change propagate through the 
different stages of the policy process, producing a considerable volume of evidence on the 
punctuated-equilibrium dynamic of policy reform (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; 2002; Jones et al. 
2003; Jones & Baumgartner 2005). The same type of analysis has been replicated by various 
scholars affiliated with the policy agendas network, finding similar patterns of policy reform across 
different countries (Jones et al. 2009), and even at the supranational level, as in the case of the 
European Union (Citi 2013). 
These two branches of the literature have co-existed for quite a long time, with limited 
constructive dialogue. On the one hand, the conceptual work has developed nuanced taxonomies of 
policy changes, but has not devised proper tools for operationalizing and measuring their concepts. 
On the other hand, those who have focused their attention on the empirical long-term policy 
dynamics have accumulated considerable evidence of punctuated-equilibrium dynamics affecting 
the decision-making processes of different political systems. However, there has been a general 
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neglect of the crucial theoretical distinctions made by Hall (1993), i.e. the distinction between 
policy settings, policy instruments, and policy goals, pooling all the different dimensions of policy 
change into one: the change in budgetary size of the government’s programs. While this reduction 
of complexity to one dimension is only appropriate for measuring change in distributive (or re-
distributive) policies – i.e. those policies leaving a footprint in the budget – it is not a viable 
approach for studying change in regulatory legislation, where a distinction between policy ends, 
tools, and settings is still key for the development of a valid and reliable measure of policy change. 
 Recent attempts to combine the two perspectives constitute an important advancement in this 
field. Knill et al. (2012) in particular have shown how a clear differentiation between policy ends, 
policy tools, and policy settings makes the operationalization and measurement of regulatory policy 
change on three different levels possible. Their approach involves counting events of regulatory 
expansion and regulatory dismantling at the three levels of analysis, on the basis of a specifically 
developed three-tier coding procedure. At the first level, policies are represented as multi-
dimensional choices, pursuing several different targets. For instance, competition policy can target 
cartels, mergers and acquisitions, the abuse of dominant positions, the use of state aid, or all of them 
at different points in time. Any time a new piece of regulatory legislation adds a new target to the 
status quo policy, this is counted as an event of regulatory expansion. At the second level, we have 
policy tools, which are the specific ways in which policy targets are materially implemented. This 
can, for instance, be the imposition of certain obligations, procedures, penalties, taxes/levies or 
standards, the creation of an independent authority for the pursuit of the same targets, or the 
extension of its regulatory powers. Any time a new regulatory act mandates the use of a 
new/additional policy tool, this is counted as an event of regulatory expansion. In contrast, if a new 
legislative act repeals some existing regulatory policy tools, this is counted as an event of policy 
dismantling. Finally, policy settings are the concrete settings of the chosen policy tools, and any 
new provision that strengthens the current settings or makes them stricter, are counted as events of 
regulatory expansion, whereas the loosening of the current settings are counted as events regulatory 
dismantling.  Hence, if we stick to the example of competition policy, the provision of a higher fine 
for cartels or market sharing agreements would count as an even of regulatory expansion. 
The data resulting from the coding of these three levels of regulatory legislation represent in 
numerical terms the ‘trajectories’ of regulatory reform, which can then be combined to calculate 
two key variables: one variable that captures the change in regulatory density, and a second variable 
that captures regulatory intensity. Regulatory density is calculated by summing all the new policy 
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targets and instruments introduced by new legislation over a given period of time, e.g. over yearly 
cycles. The reason why it is called regulatory density is that the variable represents the overall 
concentration of provisions affecting a given policy area within a given period of time. The second 
variable, however, is called regulatory intensity because it measures the extent to which the existing 
regulatory instruments are made tougher or softer. In this paper, we use the change in regulatory 
density as our key dependent variable, as our data show that the overall changes in regulatory 
intensity across the eight sectors have been minimal and in practice negligible. 
 
2.1. New data on regulatory change 
This paper draws on the method developed by Knill et al. (2012) to measure the extent to which EU 
legislation regulating eight key network industries has changed over three decades (1984-2012). 
The data we develop contain the entire population of regulations, directives and decisions regulating 
the eight sectors within the time period 1984-2012. The relevant acts (169 acts in total) were 
collected through EurLex using the following method: we started from the current legislation in 
force in the eight sectors, and then chain-referred these acts to the act that they intended to amend or 
repeal (we used the ‘relationship between documents’ section of the EurLex for this purpose), up to 
the point where we either hit the base year (1984) or did not find any previous legislation.  
The procedure for coding legislation started with the first layer: we checked whether the new 
regulatory act was addressing a new policy goal (or ‘target’) not addressed by previous legislation, 
and in case it did, we codified this as an event of regulatory expansion. For instance, if a new act 
regulating air transport addressed for the first time the issue of liberalization of groundhandling 
services, we coded it as a new policy target, and hence as an event of regulatory expansion. We then 
moved to the second layer: policy instruments. We investigated whether the act introduced new 
policy instruments and classified them according to our codebook (codes 101-118), which is 
available in Appendix I.1 For example, if the act introduced a fine for maintaining monopolies in the 
groundhandling sector, this was codified as an event of regulatory expansion. Finally, we looked at 
the third layer: policy settings. If the new act made the existing policy instrument stricter (e.g. a 
higher fine for monopolistic behaviour in the groundhandling sector), this was counted as an event 
of regulatory expansion. All provisions going in the opposite direction (e.g. cancellation of existing 
policy instruments or softening of existing policy settings) were coded as events of regulatory 
dismantling. To give an example, in year 2008 we counted two regulations affecting the air 
																																																								
1	The	appendix	is	available	at	https://sites.google.com/site/mkjustesen/	
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transport sector (216/2008 and 1008/2008), which were coded as producing a total of 16 events of 
regulatory expansion: one new policy target (harmonization of flight safety standards) and 15 new 
policy instruments. No events of regulatory dismantling were identified in this year. 
Despite the fact that the method of analysis for change in policy output follows the method 
developed by Knill et al. (2012), the latter was developed for codifying regulation in the field of 
environmental legislation. Therefore, we carefully adapted the coding procedure to capture the 
specificities and the complexity of regulation within the network industries. More specifically, we 
introduced several new codes to capture the wide range of procedures that are typically employed 
for liberalizing the network industries (ownership unbundling of the network, equality in third party 
access, public service obligations etc.). More details of the codebook are available in Appendix I.  
 
3. Explaining regulatory change: Institutional and political sources 
How can we explain variations in regulatory change within the EU? To address this question, we 
consider two groups of variables: institutional and political variables. The first group of variables 
captures the changing institutional landscape of the EU in the last 30 years, and their impact on the 
capability of the EU to reform its policies. In particular, we focus on those changes to the legislative 
process that have either increased the number of veto points (e.g. the granting of veto power to the 
Parliament), or reconfigured the composition of collective veto players (e.g. new members joining 
the EU and its Council), or changed the voting procedures in the Council. The second group of 
variables are political, i.e. variables that are related to the changing political composition of the 
Parliament and the Council, with the consequent reconfiguration of policy preferences within these 
legislative bodies (along the dimension of a higher or lower degree of market regulation). In the 
group of political variables, we include a variable that tracks the higher or lower level policy 
entrepreneurship of the Commission, which has historically varied depending on the stronger or 
softer ‘styles’ of Commission’s leadership (Peterson 1999) and on changing degrees of informal 
agenda-setting powers  (Pollack 2003: 51-53). In what follows, we explain the hypothesised role of 
these variables.  
 
3.1. Institutional variables 
We start with a variable that is central in determining the extent to which political institutions 
constrain political actors’ ability to reform status quo policies: the number of veto players (Tsebelis 
2002: 25). In the context of the EU, two institutional changes have added a veto point to the 
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legislative system: the introduction of Codecision I with the Maastricht Treaty, which gave the 
European Parliament the role of quasi-veto player, and the introduction of Codecision II with the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which gave the Parliament the status of formal veto player (Tsebelis 2002: 256–
259). In this study we focus in particular on Codecision II (coded as a dummy variable in the 
dataset), since the high level of collinearity of Codecision I and Codecision II does not it make 
possible to evaluate the independent effect of Codecision I on the legislative process.  
The second institutional variable is the number of EU member states, i.e. the process of EU 
enlargement, which might have a constraining effect on the EU legislative process. Several works in 
the literature have stressed this possibility, especially due to the fact that an enlarged membership 
may have introduced preference heterogeneity within the EU Council, with the effect of 
constraining the Council’s ability to make decisions (Hosli 1999; König & Bräuninger 2004; 
Zimmer et al. 2005; Veen 2011).  
The third institutional variable is related to the Council’s voting procedure. Since the Single 
European Act introduced qualified majority voting (QMV) for issues dealing with the internal 
market, the established threshold for a qualified majority in the Council as well as the number of 
votes allocated to each member state, have been subject to change. Consequently, the size of the 
unanimity core, as well as the size of the status quo winset, has not remained stable. For instance, 
the Treaty of Nice introduced a triple majority, which resulted in an increase in the unanimity core 
of the Council (Tsebelis 2002: 270–271), whereas the Treaty of Lisbon simplified the Council 
voting procedure, significantly reducing the number of states whose support is necessary to adopt or 
reform policies (Tsebelis 2012). In order to capture these changes to the unanimity core and to the 
status quo winset of the Council, we rely on a variable that measures the percentage of winning 
coalitions out of the total number of possible coalitions determined by each combination of QMV 
threshold and voting weights. This measure, which is used elsewhere in the literature on veto 
players (Tsebelis 2006; 2012), is similar to measures used in power index analysis and quantifies 
the extent to which certain combinations of QMV thresholds and voting weights allow the building 
of winning coalitions in the Council.2 High values on the coalition value denote that the number of 
winning coalition as a fraction of the total number of coalitions is high, which means that there are 
fewer institutional constraints on policy-making. In such circumstances, it should therefore be easier 
to form coalitions favouring regulatory reform. 
																																																								
2	The	number	of	winning	coalitions	is	calculated	with	software	developed	by	Thomas	Bräuninger,	called	Indices	
of	Power	–	IOP	2.0,	available	on	http://www.tbraeuninger.de/download/	
8	
	
	
3.2. Political variables 
The second set of covariates is a small number of political variables that have been identified by the 
literature as having a potentially significant influence on the output of the policy process. In 
particular, the political composition of the EU Parliament, Commission and Council, i.e. the 
‘colour’ of their majorities, is thought to have a substantial impact on regulatory legislation 
(Kreppel & Tsebelis 1999; Tsebelis & Garrett 2000; Gabel & Hix 2002; Hix 2008: 40–49). There 
are two reasons for this claim. The first is that centre-left and centre-right majorities have 
historically had opposing policy preferences with regard to common market regulation: the former 
has normally favoured highly regulated markets, whereas the latter has typically preferred a more 
laissez faire approach. The second reason is that since the EU Parliament has been granted veto 
power on first-pillar policies, discordant majorities in the Council and the Parliament can produce 
policy gridlocks, perpetuating status-quo oriented policy choices (Hix 2008: 45). Hence, we test the 
impact of the political composition of these three bodies on regulatory reform in the eight sectors, 
as well as the effect of discordant majorities in the Parliament and in the Council. The time series 
data we employ for this purpose are extracted from the dataset developed by Klüver and Sagarzazu 
(2013), which estimates the political composition and orientation of the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council, based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). 
Another political variable that is potentially important in determining stability and change in 
regulatory legislation is the degree of ‘policy entrepreneurship’ of the Commission, i.e. its 
capability to set the substantive agenda of policy reform for the EU legislators (Pollack 2003: 47). 
Policy entrepreneurship involves a number possible initiatives aimed at promoting policy reform. 
These range from pre-legislative activities (producing white papers, green papers, policy reports), to 
prioritising issues on the EU agenda, and presenting new legislative proposals that can gather 
enough consensus in the Council and the Parliament. Different Commissions have historically been 
characterized by different degrees of policy entrepreneurship, and this could be one of the key 
determinants of regulatory reform in the EU. Hence, we take the yearly number of legislative 
proposals initiated by the Commission (directives, regulations and decisions) as a proxy indicator 
for the level of policy entrepreneurship of the Commission. Moreover, considering that each 
legislative proposal can take up to two years before it is adopted, we include lagged values of this 
variable. The data are from the EUPOL dataset (Häge 2011).3 Summary statistics for all variables 
are available in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
																																																								
3	Data	available	at	http://frankhaege.eu/	
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4. Regulatory change over time 
We start the empirical analysis by showing how regulatory reform has evolved over time within the 
eight sectors analysed in this paper. In general, the eight sectors are characterized by differing 
volumes of regulatory legislation. As Figure 1 shows, sectors like air transport, railway transport 
and telecommunications contain a higher number of events of regulatory expansion than maritime 
transport or postal services. This tendency appears clearly from the cumulative frequencies of 
regulatory changes, shown in light grey in Figure 1.  
	
	
This is mostly due to the important role played by technology in the former sectors, the volume of 
safety provisions within these sectors, and the high number of provisions associated with the 
building of the trans-European networks. The focus of our analysis, however, is on the yearly 
changes in regulatory density, which is independent of the overall volume of legislation in each 
sector. The general pattern of regulatory reform is characterized by a great deal of policy stability 
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and incrementalism, and by a very limited number of spikes of regulatory expansion, as shown in 
the dark-grey area of Figure 1.  
However, in this paper we are interested in the general pattern and sources of regulatory 
change. Therefore, we collapse regulatory changes across the eight sectors into one variable, 
measuring the overall change in regulatory density. This is shown Figure 2 and serves as the 
dependent variable in the econometric analysis. As Figure 2 shows, aggregating the sectors into one 
variable implies that the distribution of regulatory changes becomes less skewed compared to the 
distribution of the individual sectors. However, while the number of regulatory changes span from a 
minimum of three to a maximum of 61, the median number of regulatory changes across sectors is 
16, supporting the idea the regulatory reform in general is relatively incremental.       
	
				 	
	
5. Estimation 
By construction, the dependent variable – the yearly changes in regulatory density across eight 
industries – is a nonnegative integer or count variable. We therefore use regression models for count 
data to analyse the impact of the explanatory variables on regulatory changes. While the Poisson 
regression model is a common starting point for analyses of count data, an important property of the 
Poisson distribution is that the data are equidispersed, meaning that the variance is equal to the 
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mean (Cameron & Trivedi 2005: 670). However, count data often exhibit a property known as 
overdispersion, which means that the variance exceeds the mean. Violation of the Poisson model’s 
equidispersion property has consequences similar to violation of the homoscedasticity assumption 
in linear regression (Cameron & Trivedi 2005: 670; Long & Freese 2006: 376). That is, 
overdispersion leads to downward bias in the standard errors and inflated z-values. One way to deal 
with this issue is to use the negative binomial regression model, which relaxes the equidispersion 
property of the Poisson model by allowing for overdispersion in the data (Cameron & Trivedi 2005: 
674-675; Long & Freese 2006: 372). As shown below, there is quite strong evidence of 
overdispersion in our data, and for this reason we use the negative binomial regression model rather 
than the Poisson model. As an alternative, we also perform a logarithmic transformation of the 
dependent variable to make it more normally distributed, and use the logarithmically transformed 
count of regulatory changes as dependent variable in OLS regressions to check the robustness of the 
results. To economize on space, results from the OLS regressions are shown in Appendix A, but 
they are qualitatively similar to the results obtained from the count models.  
	
						 	
	
Before we proceed with the regressions, we check the time-series properties of the data. As a 
starting point, plotting the time series of changes in regulatory density – as done in Figure 3 – does 
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not reveal any apparent trend in the dependent variable, which could suggest that the time series is 
stationary. However, to formally test whether the dependent variables follow a unit root process, we 
use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to check for a unit root in the count of regulatory changes and 
the logarithmically transformed regulatory changes. These tests clearly reject the null-hypothesis of 
a unit root in the time series of regulatory changes (the critical value is Z(t)=3.73 at the 1 % level). 
We also check for serial correlation in the residuals (results are reported in Table 1 below). In the 
negative binomial regressions, we do so by obtaining the response residuals – the difference 
between the observed and expected count – and then use the Portmanteau (Q) statistic to test for 
residual serial correlation. We also run a simple autoregressive model of the current residuals on the 
lagged residuals as an additional test for serial correlation. In both cases, the tests clearly fail to 
reject the null-hypothesis of no serial correlation. In the OLS regressions (Appendix A), we use 
Durbin’s alternative test and the Breusch-Godfrey test to check for first-order serial correlation. 
Again, the tests do not reject the null-hypothesis of no serial correlation. Overall, these tests do not 
provide evidence of significant time-series dynamics in the form of non-stationarity and serial 
correlation in the data.  
 
6. Results 
Table 1 shows results from 12 negative binomial regressions with the count of yearly changes in 
regulatory density as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are included 
contemporaneously (year t). The reason for this is that institutional and political constraints in year t 
determine the scope of regulatory reform in year t. The only exception is the legislative proposals 
variable which is lagged one year (t-1). The reason for lagging legislative proposals is that the vast 
majority of the regulatory reforms (roughly 80%) take up to 12 months to go through the decision-
making process (Klüver & Sagarzazu 2013: 394). However, in models 1-6, we do not include the 
number of legislative proposals as an explanatory variable because it may serve as an intervening 
variable in relation to at least some of the other variables. For instance, it is plausible that the ability 
to form winning coalitions – and the corresponding constraints on decision-making powers – affects 
the capability of the Commission to act as a policy entrepreneur, and in this way affects the number 
of legislative acts proposed by the Commission. This could lead to ‘post-treatment bias’ that 
conceals the effect of the institutional rules governing the formation of winning coalitions in the 
Council. However, since we also want to test the relationship between regulatory changes and 
legislative proposals, we include it in models 7-12, which also add a one-year lagged dependent 
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variable (LDV). The bottom part of Table 1 shows results from the tests for serial correlation 
(mentioned above) and likelihood-ratio statistics for tests of overdispersion, which tests the null-
hypothesis that the data satisfy the equidispersion restriction of the Poisson model (Long & Freese 
2006: 376-377). These tests provide strong evidence for overdispersion and show that the negative 
binomial model fits the data better than the Poisson model.  
In model 1 we run a base model with only three variables: The percentage of winning coalitions 
in the Council, the number of EU member countries, and the Codecision-II dummy. To ease 
interpretation we report the regression coefficients in the form of so-called incidence-rate ratios 
(IRR) rather than the log of the expected count. The IRRs are exponentiated coefficients (eβ), and 
show the factor change in the expected count of regulatory changes for a one-unit change in the 
explanatory variable, holding the other variables in the model constant (Long & Freese 2006: 359-
360). For purposes of interpretation, this means that IRRs larger than one (eβ>1) correspond to a 
positive effect, while IRRs less than one (eβ<1) correspond to a negative effect.  
In model 1, the results show that the percentage of winning coalitions in the Council has a 
positive effect on the number of regulatory changes. Recall that the number of winning coalitions is 
measured on scale from 0-100 percent, where higher values imply that it is easier to form winning 
coalitions in the Council and hence change status quo legislation. Specifically, a one-unit change in 
winning coalitions – corresponding to a one percent change – increases regulatory density by a 
factor of 1.16. In other words, a one percent increase in winning coalitions will, on average, result 
in a highly significant 16 percent increase in regulatory density per year. This effect is highly 
significant with a z-value close to six. Moreover, the result for the winning coalition variable is 
robust to different model specifications and changes in the set of control variables in Table 1, just as 
the magnitude of the coefficient is fairly stable throughout all models.  
The increased number of member countries in the EU has also significantly increased the 
regulatory density across the eight sectors. By the estimate in model 1, an additional member state 
on average increases the yearly changes in regulatory density by around 8 percent. This result is 
also quite robust throughout the different models in Table 1 and statistically significant in all 
regressions except model 12. Although this finding might appear counterintuitive, it can be 
explained by the fact that new member states bring new preferences for standards and market-
related rules into the EU. 
14	
	
	
Table	1.	Explaining	Regulatory	Reform	in	the	EU,	1984‐2012.		
Model		 (1)	 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)	
Regulatory	reformt‐1 	 	 0.997 0.991 0.991 0.989 0.991 0.994	
	 	 	 (‐0.40) (‐1.39) (‐1.20) (‐1.58) (‐1.27) (‐0.82)	
Winning	coalitionst 1.158***	 1.143*** 1.150*** 1.132*** 1.162*** 1.129***	 1.125*** 1.158*** 1.147*** 1.150*** 1.136*** 1.097**	
	 (5.97)	 (3.95) (5.47) (4.46) (4.94) (4.50) (3.09) (4.33) (3.69) (4.12) (3.01) (2.23)	
EU	membershipt 1.081**	 1.097*** 1.119*** 1.147*** 1.111*** 1.120***	 1.071* 1.107*** 1.125*** 1.170*** 1.121*** 1.081	
	 (2.28)	 (2.77) (3.23) (3.30) (2.88) (3.04) (1.79) (3.00) (3.41) (3.72) (3.40) (1.54)	
Codecision‐IIt 1.059	 1.024 1.381 0.429 0.978 0.462**	 1.186 1.042 1.535 0.391 1.020 0.338***	
	 (0.13)	 (0.05) (0.75) (‐1.29) (‐0.05) (‐2.43)	 (0.36) (0.09) (0.90) (‐1.47) (0.04) (‐2.83)	
Left‐right	Commissiont 	 1.013 	 0.998
	 	 (0.26) 	 (‐0.03)
Left‐right	Councilt 	 	 1.084 	 1.090*
	 	 	 (1.56) 	 (1.65)
Left‐right	Parliamentt 	 	 1.100 	 1.113
	 	 	 (1.19) 	 (1.33)
Left‐right	max.	distancet 	 	 1.002 	 1.006
	 	 	 (0.70) 	 (1.26)
Thornt	 	 	 0.658 	
	 	 	 (‐0.58)	 	
Delorst	 	 	 0.881 	 0.316	
	 	 	 (‐0.19)	 	 (‐1.14)	
Santert	 	 	 1.036 	 0.496	
	 	 	 (0.08) 	 (‐0.97)	
Prodit	 	 	 2.260***	 	 1.727*	
	 	 	 (3.17) 	 (1.82)	
Leg.	Proposalst‐1 	 	 1.003 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.003 1.005	
	 	 	 (0.72) (0.01) (0.45) (‐0.06) (0.63) (1.19)	
Constant	 2.349**	 2.160* 1.083 1.482 1.439 1.965 1.566 2.075 0.753 1.326 0.781 2.784	
	 (2.08)	 (1.70) (0.14) (0.99) (0.61) (0.64) (0.52) (0.96) (‐0.26) (0.37) (‐0.23) (0.96)	
Serial	correlation	test	I 0.74	 0.23 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.58 0.81 0.96 0.95 0.78 0.94 0.32	
Serial	correlation	test	II 0.77	 0.26 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.62 0.83 0.97 0.96 0.80 0.95 0.37	
Overdispersion 287.3***	 167.4*** 155.3*** 161.4*** 159.2*** 175.2***	 199.8*** 153.2*** 138.2*** 142.6*** 140.4*** 162.6***	
Observations 29	 27 27 27 27 29 28 26 26 26 26 28	
Note.	The	dependent	variable	is	the	count	of	regulatory	reforms	(yearly	changes	in	regulatory	density).	All	models	are	estimated	using	negative	binomial	regression	in	Stata	12.	Coefficients	are	incidence‐
rate	ratios.	All	variables	are	measured	contemporaneously	except	legislative	proposals	and	the	LDV	which	are	lagged	one	year.	Serial	correlation	test	I	reports	the	p‐value	of	the	Portmanteau	(Q)	statistics.	
Serial	correlation	test	II	reports	the	p‐value	of	the	lagged	residuals	on	current	residuals.	The	overdispersion	tests	show	the	likelihood‐ratio	test	statistics	of	the	null‐hypothesis	that	α=0,	i.e.	that	the	data	
satisfy	 the	 equidispersion	 restriction.	 Standard	 errors	 are	 robust	 with	 z‐statistics	 in	 parentheses.	 ***	 p<0.01,	 **	 p<0.05,	 *	 p<0.1.
From a log-rolling perspective, this gives rise to more bargaining and vote-trading among member 
states, which may lead to a higher number of regulatory changes. Finally, the introduction of 
Codecision-II does not appear to have had any significant impact on regulatory reforms, once we 
control for the other variables in the model. This might be because the range of policy preferences 
represented in the Council are wider, or similar, to the range of policy preferences expressed in the 
Parliament, bringing no real change to the status quo winset.  
In models 2-4 we add variables measuring the ideological position of the Commission (model 
2), the Council (model 3), and the Parliament (model 4) on a one-dimensional left-right scale, using 
a recent dataset on the ideological composition of European institutions (Klüver & Sagarzazu 
2013).4 Moreover, model 5 adds a measure of the maximum ideological distance between EU 
institutions, which is part of the same data.  We include this variable because ideological distance 
may capture the impact of heterogeneity in the policy preferences of veto players in the EU system, 
which could curb the ability of veto players to agree on implementing regulatory reforms. 
Interestingly, however, none of the political-ideological variables display any particular relationship 
with regulatory changes, and the ideological distance among veto players does not seem to matter 
either. This suggests that while institutional constraints on the ability to form winning coalitions in 
the Council do seem to affect regulatory reform, political constraints in the form of ideological 
heterogeneity seem to matter less.  
Finally, in model 6 we add a full set of dummy variables for the Presidents of the 
Commissions, which are intended to capture idiosyncrasies related to the regulatory behaviour of 
the various Commissions during the period we examine. Since our data covers the period 1984-
2012, we include dummy variables for Gaston Thorn (1981-1985), Jacques Delors (1985-1995), 
Jacques Santer (1995-1999), and Romano Prodi (1999-2004), while José Manuel Barroso’s 
presidency (2004–) serves as the reference category. In most cases, the Commissioner dummy 
variables are insignificant, the only exception being the Prodi dummy which is significantly 
positive. This means that relative to the Barroso Commissions, the Prodi Commission enacted 
significantly more regulatory changes within the sectors we examine.  
In models 7-12, we replicate the regression in models 1-6, but add a lagged dependent variable 
and the variable measuring the number of legislative proposals. However, the LDV is always 
insignificant – as we would expect given the lack of trend and persistency in the data – and has little 
effect on the results for the other explanatory variables. The number of legislative proposals is 
																																																								
4	The	time	series	of	these	data	end	in	2010,	and	therefore	we	lose	two	observations.		
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measured on a scale from zero and onwards. Based on model 7, a one unit increase in legislative 
proposals in the previous year (t-1) increases the number regulatory changes (at time t) by a factor of 
1.003. This means that each additional legislative proposal issued by the Commission (a one-unit 
change) will on average produce a 0.3% increase in regulatory density. However, the effect of 
legislative proposals is insignificant in all models. This means that there does not appear to be a 
systematic relationship between the legislative proposals put forward by the Commission and the 
number of regulatory changes that are actually implemented.  
Indeed, the most noteworthy result in models 7-12 is that the winning coalition variable 
continues to be positive and highly significant. Even controlling for a host of other factors, 
regulatory changes within the eight industries in our data seem to be systematically affected by 
changes in the institutional rules that govern the making of winning coalitions in the EU Council. 
That is, the volume of regulatory reforms has systematically decreased as it has become more 
difficult for member states to form winning coalitions in the Council. This result strongly suggests 
that institutional constraints on decision-making powers – and the ability of countries to form 
winning coalitions in the EU council – seem to be the key factor enabling or restraining regulatory 
changes within the EU system.  
The findings of this analysis partly confirm some of the theoretical claims made in the literature 
on the EU legislative process. In particular, the results of the empirical analysis point to three main 
findings. First, there is clear evidence that the voting rules in the Council have a powerful impact on 
the dynamics of regulatory reform in the EU. More specifically, our findings suggest that the ability 
to form winning coalitions in the Council has a strong and significant influence on the pace and 
volume of regulatory reform. This is in line with veto player theory, which predicts that the winset 
of the status quo tends to expand as we move from unanimity voting to lower thresholds for QMV 
(Tsebelis 2002: 41). Second, the enlarged membership of the EU has a significant impact on 
regulatory reform. However, an increased membership of the EU does not seem to result in the 
maintenance of the regulatory status quo, but in an increase in regulatory density, as more diverse 
policy preferences are being incorporated in new legislation through log-rolling and bigger 
‘package deals’. Third, the political composition of the EU legislative bodies does not have a 
significant impact on the dynamic of regulatory reform in the EU. Although ideological 
incongruence can slow down the pace of decision-making (Klüver & Sagarzazu 2013), it does not 
seem to significantly affect the number and volume of regulatory reforms. Overall, these findings 
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suggest that institutional constraints and EU membership size have systematic – but countervailing 
effects – on regulatory reform within the EU. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the general dynamics of stability and change in EU regulatory legislation 
and investigated the sources of regulatory reform. To this end, we have developed an original 
dataset measuring yearly changes in regulatory density across eight sectors during the period 1984-
2012. Using this data, we have examined the impact of a number of institutional and political 
variables on regulatory change within the EU.  
The key finding of the empirical analysis is that the number of winning coalitions in the 
Council – a measure of the ability to build coalitions within the constraints of voting rules in the 
Council – contributes significantly to explain changes in regulatory legislation. Moreover, there is 
clear evidence that the increased membership of the EU has had a significant impact on regulatory 
changes within the eight sectors, which is arguably a consequence of the log-rolling dynamics 
taking place whenever the EU legislative system is ‘forced’ to accommodate to increasing 
heterogeneity in policy preferences for regulatory standards among its member states. However, 
looking at the political sources of regulatory change, we have not found systematic evidence that 
the Commission’s policy entrepreneurship significantly affects regulatory reform in the EU. 
Relative to the incumbent Barroso Commission, only Prodi’s Commission was significantly more 
active in the area of regulatory reform. Finally, we have not found significant evidence that the 
ideological composition and distance of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council have a 
significant impact on regulatory changes. Indeed, regulatory reform seems to have proceeded quite 
independently of the ideological orientation of EU’s key legislative bodies. That is, while 
conventional ideological positions do not appear to be a key source of regulatory reform, 
institutional constraints on decision-making powers do matter for the magnitude of regulatory 
reform. These findings suggest that institutions trump politics in terms of explaining regulatory 
reform within the EU. However, whether this pattern generalises to policy areas outside the sectors 
we have analysed remains an open question that needs to be addressed in future work. 
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